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The October 22 Scud missile attack, which took place in the midst of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, was the first operational use of Scud missiles in the world. It witnessed Egypt launch three Scud missiles against Israeli targets. One of the missiles was fired at Arish and the others at the Israeli bridgehead on the western bank of the Suez Canal, near Deversoir. ==Background== One of the lessons learned by Egypt following the Six Day War was the need of a weapon able to hit deep inside Israel. The weapon would have to do so in a way which would interrupt any Israeli attack manoeuvres, and would also serve as a deterrent. As a result of this need, Egypt armed itself with three types of weapons: * Heavy bombers that could strike deep inside Israel. * Cruise missiles that would be able to overcome the Israeli missile defence systems. * Long range surface-to-surface missiles that would be able to strike deep inside Israel and that would be launched from deep inside Egypt, defended by Egypt's air defence networks. The Soviets feared equipping Egypt with deep-strike abilities, causing tensions between Egypt and the Soviet Union. Eventually, the Soviet Union agreed to supply Egypt with KSR-2 Surface-to-surface missiles, Tupolev Tu-16s (instead of the newer Tupolev Tu-22 Egypt requested) and a division of Scud surface-to-surface missiles. The Mossad was aware of the Scud delivery since June 1973, before the missiles had arrived in Egypt〔Ronen Bergman and Gil Meltzer, Yom Kippur War - in real time, 2004, p. 182〕 on August 24. The Soviets also trained Egyptian soldiers to operate the systems. The Scud division included 10 launchers, and Israel Military Intelligence (Aman) estimated that the manpower training would take at least 11–12 months, meaning that Egypt would only be able to use the missiles in the first quarter of 1974 at the earliest. However, it is possible that the Egyptians were operating Scud missiles on their own by October 1973. In addition, Aman learned that the Scud division would be on active duty from the beginning of October 1973. The Agranat Commission later referred to the Scud missiles and saw them as a factor that could have changed the balance of power on the battlefield.〔Agranat Commission Report: Commission Inquiry of the Yom Kippur War, the third and last part, p. 8-9.〕 Aman estimated that Egypt would not dare going to war against Israel without first equipping themselves with Scud missiles, which could act as an opposing threat to the IAF's abilities (Aman was still convinced Egypt would not be able to operate the Scud missiles before the beginning of 1974). 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「October 22 Scud missile attack」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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